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H – 691

International Court of Justice

H0691 – 0002

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal ) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

Не публиковать до того, как представлено на публичном заседании трибунала и только ту часть, которая представлена в качестве доказательства.

H0691 – 0003

I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certifie qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministére Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1945.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokumente vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Dr. Walter Siemers.

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

H0691 - 0004

(Page 372
of Orig.)

Filed May 17

Raeder No. .....81..

N.I.D. Admiralty

I hereby certify that the attached photograph is a true copy of War Diary 1 Naval Operations Staff, Folder VIII, Pages 139, 140, 141, 142, 511, and 605 the original of which is held by the British Admiralty.

Signed MC. Saunders

Commander R.N.

for Director of Naval Intelligence.

I certify, that the attached document and the above certificate are truly transcribed from the photostat copy placed at my disposal by London, and that the pages 139, 140, 141 and 142. It concerns the War Diary 1940.

Nuernberg, 25 March 1946.

Signed (Dr. W. SIMMERS)

H0691 - 0005



139

20. March

Prop.

Suggestion for the support of foreign propaganda, as far as questions of the conduct of naval warfare are concerned.

Even if the Information Branch of the Foreign Ministry is responsible, it is still the task of the Navy to give this office necessary suggesti ns and guiding principles in the field of the conduct of travel warfare and the laws of Navel Warfare.

21. March

Prop. Criticism of treatment of questions of the laws of Navel Warfare at the Foreign Press Conference. For example: treatment of the BURGERDYK case and attitude to the navicert/system.

22. March

V. Recently cases of the violation of Norwegian neutrality by British air and naval forces have been increasing. On 16 March the German motor ship "Homberg was several times circled by English planes near FEIERSTEIN within Norwegian territorial waters; on 17 March, 2 or 3 foreign planes flew over BERGEN at a height of 5000 - 6000 meters. Yesterday alone the three following cases occured:

H0691-0006



22 March.

1.) British destroyer H 64 barasses the German steamship "EUROPA" within Norwegian territorial waters. The Englishman, who rushed towards the "EUROPA" at high speed was stopped by a Norwegian torpedo boat, which crossed his course. The Englishman then turned out to sea, when the Norwegian destroyer hoisted the signal "You are within territorial waters!"

2.) German steamship "DYRINDJE" was flown over three times by an English flyer at 1030 hrs. diagonally off OBRESTAD. Distance of ship from shore 3/4 sea miles. A Norwegian seaplane, coming from the north forced the Englishman off three times, who then went off on a westerly course.

3.) The German steamship "NORDLAND" was harassed and molested for some time 15 miles south of KRISTIANSUND iwhtin Norwegian territorial waters by the English destroyer # 67. At the time of the destroyer's first manouver the "NORDLAND" was only 6 or 7 Kms. off shore. The Englishman manouvered as if he intended to capture the "NORDLAND". After 2½ hours the destroyer went away from the "NORDLAND". Captain requested protective escort from the Norwegian Admiralty by radio. The Norwegian torpedo boat "TROLL" then appeared near STADLANDET. This incident is described exactly like this by the Norwegian pilot.

H0691 - 0007

(page 375 of orig.)

1941

22 March

Today the following two cases occurred:

1.)An English torpedo boat tried to stop, by firing a warning shot the German herring steamer "BUTT" which last left HAUGESUND on the 22nd on a southerly course. According to a communique of the Norwegian Admirality a shell landed on Norwegian territory. (See 1/ Naval Operations Staff 12 501 of 2 Apr. 1940)

2.)The captain of the motor ship "NEUENFELS" sighted 2 British destroyers of the Cossack class shortly after passing LINDESNES. With increased speed, they approached to 3/4 sea miles the "NEUENFELS" which was cruising 1 1/4 sea miles off shore, and which then decided to enter the Ross Fjord. Only near ULLEROE - FEUERSTURM did the destroyers gave up the pursnit, "NEUENFELS" anchored at the northern end of Ross Fjord and later received the escort of the torpedo boat "FEIST" as far as FEISTELS, after the ship had first been searched for prisoners of war and contraband. The captain, besides; had to guarantee in a written affidavit that there were neither prisoners of war nor contraband aboard.

Above cases of violations of neutrality were communicated by the German Embassy in Oslo through the Foreign Ministry as evidence for a protest on to the Norwegian Government.

H0691 - 0008



The German ambassador had already lodged protests of his own accord in individual cases.

An examination of the question as to whether a mass encroachment by the English into the Norwegian territorial waters was so immediately imminent that it might represent a danger to present German shipping produces the opinion that this is not to be expected at the present time. The ore transports are to be continued, as no losses have yet occurred.

23.3.

V. A further inquiry of the Group command West about the conduct of a prize crew during an attempt at interference, or actual interference, by neutral war ships, is being answered (see appendix 15)

French Commissions recently attempted to buy up Italian fishing craft. According to reports by the German Naval Attache from Rome the Italian Government, however, refuses its consent to any planned change of registry.

H0691 - 0009

Filed May 17

(Page 377
of orig.)

RAEDER No. . . 82 . . . . .

CERTIFICATE.

I, Hans MECKEL, Fregattenkapitaen, Assistant Defense Counsel,

hereby certify that the attached document, consisting of

..... 1 ..... typwritten pages

..... photostated

entitled:

War Diary, Naval Operations Staff, Part A 1940

. . . . . .

K T B S K 1 Teil A 1940

. . . . . .

is a true copy of War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff

Part A 1940

. . . . . .

which the British Admiralty made availabel to me as an original document captured by Allied military forces.

. . . . . .

H0691 - 0010



27 March

According to a reliable special dispatch from Norway ( conversation with Dir. Hagelien (Quisling adherent) at the High Command of the Navy) The Norwegian Admiralty Staff expects that within a foreseeable time England herself will officially assume protection of Norwegian territorial waters and is afraid of an impending English move. To justify the [illegible] English procedure abroad it is said that possibly a few incidents will be manufactured, that is provoked. According to a report from our Norwegian contact man (Gewaehrsmann) the Norwegian cabinet are not yet in full agreement among themselves as to their attitude in case of an English demarche. One part favors issuing clear orders to shoot - which of course will only mean "shooting in the air", in order to preserve the appearance of neutrality to the outside world. Another part requires the preliminary resignation of the cabinet in order to avoid responsibility.

( For further details of the conversation, see transcript of the conversation of 26 March Handwritten File on "Exercise - Weser" KTB part B, book V, 120)

H0691 - 0011

Filed May 17



Raeder No. ....83....

Defense Exhibit No. ....

Declaration by Attorney -at - Law Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the document below:

Draft Resolution of sixth meeting of the Supreme Council, 28 March 1940

from the

White Book No. 6 of the Foreign Office, Berlin 1941:

"Secret Documents of the French General Staff"

has been copied correctly from page 73-74, document No. 30.

Nuernberg, 16 March 1946.

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691-0012



Draft Resolution of sixth meeting of the
Supreme Council, 28 March 1940

Very Secret

The Supreme Council has resolved:

1. That on Monday, 1 April, the French and British Governments shall address to the Norwegian and Swedish Governments a note based on Paragraph No. 7 of the draft of the aide-memoire drawn up by the British Government, to wit:

a) The Allied Governments cannot tolerate another attack upon Finland, either by the Soviet Government or by the German Government. If such an act of aggression took place and if the Swedish and Norwegian Governments refused to grant facilities for the efforts being made by the Allied Governments to afford Finland help in the manner they consider opportune, and , a fortiori, if the Swedish and Norwegian Governments attempt to prevent such help, this attitude would be considered by the Allies as contrary to their vital interests and would provoke an appropriate reaction.

b) Every exclusive political agreement which might be made by Sweden and Norway with Germany would be regarded by the Allied Governments as an unfriendly

H0691 - 0013



act, even if this agreement had as its apparent object the defence of Finland. Every Scandinavian alliance which involved the acceptance of German help and which thus caused the Scandinavian States to entertain special political relations with Germany would be considered by us as being directed against ourselves.

c) Any attempt by the Soviet Union which aimed at obtaining from Norway a position on the Atlantic Coast would be contrary to the vital interests of the Allies and would provoke the appropriate reaction.

d) The Allied Governments would have to adopt appropriate measures in order to safeguard their interests, if the Swedish and Norwegian Governments should refuse, withdraw or restrict the commercial consignments and the merchant tonnage regarded by the Allied Governments as indispensable to the prosecution of the war and with which the Scandinavian Governments can supply us under reasonable conditions.

e) Finally, in view of the fact that the Allies are fighting for aims which concern the small nations no less than themselves, the Allies cannot allow the course of the war to run the risk of undergoing any modification on account of advantages granted to Germany by Sweden

. . . .

H0691 - 0014



and Norway. In consequence, they declare that they reserve for themselves the right of adopting such measures as they consider useful for hindering or preventing Germany from obtaining from Sweden and Norway resources and means from which she would gain advantages to the detriment of the Allies in the prosecution of the war.

2. This note will be followed on 5 April by the laying of mines in Norwegian territorial waters and by operations against German shipping thus driven out of the territorial waters.

3. Conditionally upon the agreement of the French War Committee, the operation, "Royal Marine", will commence on 4 April and air action will commence on 15 April.

4. Plans will immediately be drawn up by the French and British General Staffs aiming at intercepting German shipping coming from Lulea as soon as the Gulf of Bothnia is open to navigation.

5. Measures will be adopted which seem possible with a view to diminishing Rumania's oil supplies to Germany.

6. An inquiry will immediately be made by British and French experts with a view to examining the project

H0691 - 0015



for an aerial bombardment of the Russian oil basin in the Caucasus. The following points will be particularly considered:—

a) The prospect of achieving effective results by this operation,

b) The probable repercussions the operations would have on Russia,

c) The probable attitude of Turkey.

7. Detailed plans shall be laid down by the British and French General Staffs and all those preparatory measures shall immediately be adopted which can be taken in advance (e. g. the dispatch of bombs to the Near East), so that the operation can be launched without delay if the decision to do so is made.

Facsimile on page 257

H0691 - 0016

(Page 384
of Orig.)

Filed May 17

Reader No. ....84....

Defence Exhibit No. ....

Declaration by Attorney - at - Law Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the document below:

Excerpt from: "Draft letter from M. REYNAUD, the French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British Prime Minister, Mr. CHAMBERLAIN"

from the

White Book No. 6 of the Foreign Office, Berlin 1941:

"Secret Documents

of the French General Staff"

has been copied correctly from page 119, document No. 49.

Nuernberg, 18 March 1946.

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691 - 0017



"Draft letter from M. REYNAUD, the French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the British Prime Minister, Mr. CHAMBERLAIN".

(Written note):
Not transmitted in this form,
but dispatched as a telegram
on 1 May 1940
(initialled)

My dear Prime Minister,

When, a month ago, after prolonged consideration and exhaustive discussions, we agreed to lay mines in Norwegian territorial waters, we did not conceal from ourselves either the importance of this operation or the further developments to which it might lead.

The issues at stake were so great that they seemed to us to justify certain risks, even serious risks.

. . . . . .

Meeting [illegible] 1940.

H0691 – 0018



(Lines 1 to 11 incl.):

General LELONG, Military Attache to the French Embassy in London, to General GAMELIN, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army

Telegram

Secret

London, 2 April 1940, 7.12 p.m.

A) The British place three berths on a cruiser and ten berths on a transporter at General AUDET's disposal.

The first convoy will sail on J. 1, which has been fixed for 5 April.

H0691 - 0019

(Page 386 of Orig.)

Filed May 17

Raeder No. ...85...

Defence Exhibit No. ....

Declaration by Attorney - at - Law Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the document below:

"General LELONG, Military Attaché to the French Embassy in London, to General GAMELIN, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army.

from the

White Book No. 6 of the Foreign Office, Berlin 1941:

"Secret Documents

of the French General Staff"

has been copied correctly from page 78, document No. 33.

Nuernberg, 7 March 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691 – 0020

(Page 388 of Orig.) Filed May 17 RAEDER No. 86

CERTIFICATE

I, Hans MECKEL, Fregattenkapitaen, Assistant Defense Counsel, hereby certify that the attached document, consisting of

1 typewritten pages

photostated

entitled

War Diary, Naval Operational Staff, Part C, Book VIII 1940

K T B S k l Teil C Heft VIII 1940

is a true copy of War Diary of the Naval Operational Staff Part C, Book VIII 1940

which the British Admiralty made available to me as an original document captured by allied military forces.

.....

H0691 - 0021



War Diary, Naval Operational Staff, Part C Book VIII 1940

(K T B  S k l  Teil C  Heft VIII  1940)

6 April  Oslo Naval Attache reports that the chartering of over 90% of the Norwegian tanker and merchant fleet by England has been proven since November 1939. The ambassador considers 66% the maximum limit agreed upon.

H0691 - 0022

(Page 390
of orig)

Rejected

RAEDER NO./87.....

Declaration by Attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the document below:

The Admiralty to the British Consul,

NARVIK, 97032

from White Book No. 4 of the Foreign Office,

Berlin 1940

Documents concerning Anglo-French policy of extending the war,

has been copied correctly from

Group B : Code Telegram in clear text from the control book of the British consul in NARVIK, document No. 12.

Nuernberg, 8 April 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691 – 0023



Group B, Doc. No. 12

From Admiralty 97032

To British Consul, Narvik

From admiralty. N.C.L. Roseberry has been appointed to Narvik as British Consul. He leaves United Kingdom by air on the 8th April. N. Roseberry has been appointed Consul at Narvik for special reasons. His appointment does not reflect upon the manner in which you have hitherto performed your duties, which has given Complete Satisfaction and you should continue to take charge of Naval Control Duties at Narvik.

T.O.R. 0930/7/4. T.O.O. 1925/6/4/40

Facsimile located on same page as translation.

H0691-0024

(Page 392
of Orig.)

Filed May 18

RAEDER No. 88

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration by Attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS.

I herewith certify that the document below:

British order concerning preparations for the occupation of the Northern Swedish ore fields with NARVIK as base, April 6, 1940.

from White Book No. 5 of the German Foreign Office, Berlin 1940:

Further documents concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending the war, The General Staff conferences by England and France with Belgium and the Netherlands,

has been copied correctly from pages 52, 53, 54, 55, document No. 20.

Nuernberg, 21 March 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691 – 0025

(Page 393, lines 1 to 19 incl.)

British order concerning preparations for the occupation of the northern Swedish ore fields with Narvik as base, April 6, 1940

Secret

Appendix A

Issued with Avonforce O.O. No. 1.

Role of Avonforce whilst in Norway

Role.

1. The task of AVONFORCE is in (i) tially to secure the port of NARVIK and the railway to the SWEDISH frontier. While the force remains in NORWAY, its role is to provide for the security of the port, and of the railway against attack by German forces from SWEDEN, and sabotage or any other action by local hostile dements.

If opportunity offers, the Commander intends to advance into SWEDEN and occupy the GALLIVARE ore fields and important centres in that area. On no account will armed forces advance across the frontier without express orders from Force H. Q.

H0691-0026

(Page 396, lines 3 to 12 incl.)

8. Although it may be assumed that no opposition will be met with from NORWEGIAN armed forces, as a normal measure of military security, the possibility of hostile action cannot be disregarded. Plans must therefore be made om this basis. If the active/and effective co-operation of the NORWEGIAN forces can be secured, it should be possible to reduce considerably the number of AVONFORCE troops who would otherwise be required for internal security, coast-watching, and other duties.

H0691-0027

(Page 398, lines 25 to 27 incl.)

Troops available.

17. The force available at various stages to carry out the defensive role given in para. 1 will be: -

H0691-0028

(Page 399, lines 1 to 10 incl.)

(a) If the 1st Convoy is limited to one personnel ship - one infantry battalion ( 1st Scots Guards).

(b) If the 1st Convoy consists of two personnel ships - two infantry battalions (1st Scots Guards and 2nd South Wales Borderers) and 3 Lt. A.A. By. battery.

(c) After arrival of 2nd Convoy - 24 Inf. Bde. and 3 Lt. A.A. Btys. batteries.

H0691 - 0029

Filed May 17

(Page 400
of original)

89
RAEDER No. .....

CERTIFICATE.

I, Hans MECKEL, Fregattenkapitaen, Assistant Defense Counsel, hereby certify that the attached document, consisting of

1
..... typewritten
..... photostated
pages

entitled

War Diary, Naval Operational Staff, Part A

. . . . . .

(K T B S K L Teil A)

. . . . . .

War Diary of the Naval Operational Staff, Part A

is a true copy of . . . . . .

. . . . . .

which the British Admiralty made available to me as an original document captured by allied military forces.

. . . . . .

H0691-0030



War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, Part A

8 April 1940.

2) Question of flying colors during entrance into Norwegia ports:

Naval Operations Staff (Skl) decides on entry under German colors, or,according to the situation, also without colors. The previous order is rescinded; the British battle flag is not to be hoisted, since advantages from flying British colors cannot be recognized, and appear at least doubtful.

Appropriate order will be issued.

(Page 402
of Orig.)

Filed May 17

RAEDTR NO....90....

Nuernberg, .18 April 1946..

CERTIFICATE

I, Hans MECKEL, Fregattenkapitaen, Assistant Defense Counsel, hereby certify that the attached document consisting of

.....2..... typewritten
..... photostated pages

entitled:

War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff, Part A
K T B Skl Teil A)
.....
.....

is a true copy of .....
....War.Diary.of.the.Naval.Operational.Staff.Part.A.1940.....
which the British Admiralty made available to me as an original document captured by Allied military forces.

.....



H0691 - 0031

H0691 – 0032

War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff Part A

(KTB Skl Teil A)

8 April 1940 Weser Day minus 1

Special Political News

1) The Norwegian Question.

Statement by the British and French Governments to Norway about mine-laying by the Allies in Norwegian territorial waters.

"The Allied governments have decided to exclude their enemy from the unhindered use of parts of the Norwegian territorial waters, which obviously are of the greatest use to him. They have therefore decided to prevent the unhindered passage of ships with contraband on board through Norwegian territorial waters. – They herewith announce:

"Certain parts of Norwegian territorial waters have become impassible because of mines. Ships traversing these areas do so at their own risk. From the list already published, it can be clearly seen that the free entry of Norwegian ships to their own ports and their villages is in no way hindered by the laying of mines. In order also to prevent the slightest possibility that Norwegian and also

H0691 – 0033



other ships unintentionally pass through these areas at a time at which it would not yet be possible to warn them of the mines, precautions have been taken by which the demarcation lines of these areas are patrolled by British ships until a period of 48 hours after the laying of the first mines in the areas concerned. By this measure, together with the warning announced over the radio, the security of shipping is guaranteed." (For location of blockade see under "North Sea")

By laying mines within Norwegian waters, the Wester powers have now officially undertaken the flagrant violation of Norwegian neutrality. The political leadership is of the opinion that the measures taken represent only the first step of the strategic plan of the Allies, which contemplates a foothold in the northern area, prevention of ore imports from Norway, pressure on Sweden, domination of the Shetland-Norway passage, extension of the war to Scandinavia.

H0691 - 0034

(Page 405
of Orig.)

Filed May 17

Raeder No. ....91..

Defence Exhibit No. ....

Declaration by Attorney - at- Law Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the document below:

"Admiral of the Fleet DARLAN, Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, to M. DALADIER, French Minister for National Defence and War"

from the

White Book No. 6 of the Foreign Office, Berlin 1941:

"Secret Documents

of the French General Staff"

has been copied correctly from page 87-89, document No. 37.

Nuernberg, 7 March 1946.

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691 – 0035



(Lines 1 to 6 incl.):

"Admiral of the Fleet DARLAN, Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy, to M. DALADIER, French Minister for National Defence and War"

Copy. No. 37 F.M.F.O.

Secret and personal

12 April 1940

Your Excellency,

H0691 - 0036



(Lines 4 to 7 incl.):

The investigation made by the Inter-Allied Committee in March defined the duties to be carried out by our naval forces in the event of action in Norway.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

(Lines 26 to 27 incl.):

2. It does not appear to me that our Command has been taken by surprise by the "German retort",

H0691 - 0037



and perhaps it would be as well to bear in mind in this connection, in view of the lack of discretion with regard to the plans discussed at the Inter-Allied meetings, that the German Command could not be unaware of our decision: their preparations had been commenced some time ago and their warships were at sea even beforethe proposed mine-laying operations had been carried out.

The German retort was foreseen by us immediately the decision was taken by the Inter-Allied Committee on 28 March. I pointed out this possibility to you as early as 30 March and I proposed to you to take steps against it by rapidly getting together the necessary forces to form an expeditionary corps.

On 2 April, I requested General GAMELIN, the Commander-in-Chief, to let me know the exact number of troops to be transported and the time limits within which this had to be done. On the morning of 5 April, I was advised of the new composition of the expeditionary corps and I pointed out that in order to keep to the dates arranged it would be necessary to requisition on the same day (5 April) the necessary vessels (1 mail-boat, 3 cargo vessels).

General GAMELIN, the Commander-in-Chief, having been informed at 6.45 p.m. on 5 April that the Norwegian operation was going to be carried out, notified me immediately and I at once issued the requisition order.

H0691-0038



(Lines 1 to 6 incl.):

On the evening of 5 April, the British High Command, which is in charge of the expedition, informed me that the first British convoy could not leave before 8 April, which, in accordance with the scheduled dates of departure, meant that the first French detachment would leave the port of embarkation on 16 April.

H0691 - 0039

(Page 412
of orig)

Filed May 17

Raeder No. 92
Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration by Attorney Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the following is a true excerpt

from the "Statement by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop before Berlin representatives of the Foreign Press in the Council Hall (Bundesratsaal) of the Foreign Office on the morning of 9 April 1940."

from the book

"Documents of German Policy" Volume 8/I (1940), Berlin 1943, from page 35.

Nuernberg, 9 March 1946

(Dr.W. SIEMERS)

H0691 - 0040



From a speech by Ribbentrop before the Foreign Press in Berlin on 9 April 1940:

In the Anglo-French memorandum to the Norwegian government of 8 April a new international law is proclaimed, according to which a belligerent is entitled to carry out an act which is justified by the situation established through illegal acts of the enemy. 2)

---

Foot Note: 2) "International Law has always given a belligerent the right, if the enemy systematically uses illegal methods to take the appropriate measures suited to the situation which has been established through the illegality of the enemy. Such an action, which certainly is not in agreement with the law under normal conditions, becomes legal according to the generally recognized rule with regard to the violation of law by the other belligerent partner." (Monthly Brochures for Foreign Policy (Monatshefte fuer Auswaertige Politik) 7th Year (1940), Page 344 f)

H0691 - 0041

(Page 423
of orig.)

Filed May 17

RAEDER No 97
Defense Exhibit No.....

Statement of attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS

I hereby certify that the following excerpts from the "Statement of Reich Foreign Minister von RIBBENTROP before the diplomatic corps and the domestic and foreign press in the new Reich Chancellery at BERLIN on 27 April 1940 from the book

"Documents of German Policy,"
("Dokumente der deutschen Politik"),
volume 8/I (1940), BERLIN, 1943 from
pages 40,41,43,44 and 47 are a true copy,

Nuernberg, 6 March 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691 - 0042



Page 40:

From the statement of RIBBENTROP before the diplomatic corps and the press on 27 April 1940:

..... On 24 February 5) Mr. CHAMBERLAIN after the flagrant, English violation of neutrality and the attack on the German ship "ALTMARK" in Norwegian sovereign waters established that this constituted only a "technical violation of neutrality". 6) on 27 February 7) Mr. CHURCHILL declared, that he was tired of worrying about the rights of neutrals.

---

Foot note:

5) In BIRMINGHAM

6) The British Foreign Minister Lord HALIFAX adopts the same view point in his discussion with COLBAN the Norwegian ambassador in LONDON on 17 February 1940

7) In the English House of Commons.

H0691 – 0043



Page 41:

From RIBBENTROP's statement before the diplomatic corps and the press on 27 April 1940:

..... On 30 March 2) Mr. CHURCHILL announces that it would not be just for the Western Powers to continue to observe legal agreements in this life and death struggle . On 5 April Lord de la WARR 3) establishes, that neither Germany nor the neutrals could rely on England allowing her hands to be bound behind her back by literal observance of the law. On 6 April 1940 the English Minister of Labor declares 4) that neither Germany nor the neutrals could expect the Western Powers to observe the letter of international law.....

..... On 12 April Mr. DUFF COOPER 9) drops the mask completely and declares with brutal frankness:
"After making clear to the neutrals, that their own freedom and independence is at stake, we must tell them openly what we demand of them and what part each of them will have to play in the treaty which serves to destroy Germany. If one or the other

H0691-0044



of those states shows signs of hesitation , we must proceed in such a way that such a hesitation will be overcome immediately.

---

Foot Notes:

2) In the British Radio

3) Earl de la WARR was after 3 April 1940 First Commissioner for Public Works.

4) Ernest BROWN (7 June 1935 - 17 May 1940).
1938

9) Until 1 October/First Lord of the British Admiralty; from 17 May 1940 to 21 July 1941 British Minister of Information.

H0691 - 0045



Page 44:

From RIBBENTROP's declaration before the Diplomatic Corps and the press on 27 April 1940:

Foot Note 1) QUISLING: On 9 April 1940 at a mass-meeting in OSLO: ..... On 7 February 1940, the British Foreign Minister Lord HALIFAX again called the ambassador to him and informed him that England wished to establish certain bases on the Norwegian coast in order to stop the transportation of German ore from NARVIK..... English and French General Staff Officers by agreement with the Norwegian authorities inspected landing points the middle of February. On 16 February the English took practical advantage of the opportunity to test the attitude of NORWAY toward a British action. They accomplished this by a technical violation of international law. They attacked the German merchant ship "ALTMARK" in the JOESSING-FJORD (cf. above pages 11-19) and obtained satisfactory proof that the Norwegian authorities did not oppose British encroachment. Late in March they carried out five further attacks on German merchant vessels within Norwegian sovereign waters with similar results. The Norwegian government, the STORTING, limited it's reaction to pro forma protests.

(Page 430
of original)

Filed May 17

RAEDER No. 98

# C E R T I F I C A T E .

I, HANS MECKEL, Fregattenkapitaen, Assistant Defense Counsel, hereby certify that the attached document, consisting of

..... typewritten pages
..... photostated

entitled

KTB Skl Teil A .....

.....

is a true copy of Kriegstagebuch der Seekriegsleitung Teil A 1940,

which the British Admiralty made available to me as a original document captured by allied military forces.

.....



H0691 - 0046

H0691 - 0047



Wardiary Naval Operational Staff (KTB Skl) Part A.

1940.

26 April 1946.

Special political news.

Norway:

During the successful battles of the army at Lillehammer there were found an captured English officers in the form of operation orders for the English-Norwegian Operation, from which it appears unequivocally, that an English landing in Norway was prepared according to plan and at approximately the same time the German operation was intended. The orders bear the dates 2 April, 6 April, and 7 April. The enterprise bore camouflaged designation Stratford-Plan. The participating fighting forces were designated as Strat-forces. The landing in Stavanger was anticipated for occupation of the air-field Sola, in Bergen, Drontheim, and Narvik. The German action took place a few hours before the English intended to start operations, After German landing in Norway English fighting forces were steered around, while Stavanger -troops were disembarked at Andalsnes, and Bergen troops at Namses. Political leadership intends to inform the Diplomatic Corps of the documents found after all particulars have come to hand.

H0691 - 0048



Rejected

Raeder No. ...99....

Defence Exhibit No. ....

Declaration by Attorney - at- Law Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the document below:

"Minutes of the ninth meeting of the Supreme Council,

London, 27 April 1940"

from the

White Book No. 6 of the Foreign Office, Berlin 1941:

"Secret Documents

of the French General Staff"

has been copied correctly from page 103, 104, 110, 111, document No. 44.

Nuernberg, 20 March 1946.

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691 - 0049



(Lines 1 to 26 incl.):

"Minutes of the ninth meeting of the Supreme Council,

London, 27 April 1940"

Extract

Secret

The following were present:

Representing Britain:

Mr. Neville CHAMBERLAIN

Lord HALIFAX

Mr. Winston CHURCHILL

Sir Samuel HOARE

Mr. Oliver STANLEY

Sir Dudley POUND

Sir Edmund IRONSIDE

Sir Cyril NEWALL

Sir Alexander CADOGAN

Sir Edward BRIDGES

Colonel HOLLIS

Captain BERKELEY

Representing France:

His Excellency M. REYNAUD

M. DALADIER

M. CAMPINCHI

M. LAURENT EYNAC

M. CORBIN

General GAMELIN

Admiral DARLAN

General VUILLEMIN

General MITTELHAUSER

General LELONG

General DECAEN

Commander AUPHAN

Lieutenant-Colonel VILLELUME

Lieutenant-Colonel FOIDENOT

Captain CHOLLAT-TRAQUET

First Commissioner FATU

Lieutenant de MARGERIE

M. de CHARBONNIERE

His Excellency Count RACZYNSKI

His Excellency M. COLBAN

H0691 - 0050



(Line 21 to end of page):

Mr. Norville CHAMBERLAIN immediately replied to the three points raised by the Premier:--

1) As regards an offer to Sweden in order to induce that country to destroy the ironore mines, the Prime Minister was of the opinion that it was not

H0691-0051



merely a question of money, since the result of the occupation of Norway by the Germans would be that Sweden would be completely cut off from the outside world. She would not be able to communicate with other countries except via Germany. Germany would supply her with the commodities which she required and it was practically certain that Germany would demand iron-ore in payment. Was it to be expected that the Swedes would agree to the destruction of the sole medium of exchange which Germany would recognize? The Rumanian precedent was entirely different. The oilwells had been destroyed by the Rumanian Government after a German invasion. If Sweden were invaded by Germany, she would probably consent to the destruction of the ironore mines, but it was doubtful whether she would do so in any other circumstances.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

M. Paul REYNAUD congratulatedhimself on the fact that a fundamental agreement had been reached with regard to General GAMELIN's proposals. It was the business of the military experts to settle the details of these resolutions.

Reverting to the proposal to offer Sweden compensation for the eventual destruction of her ironore mines, the Premier observed that it was not a question of discovering whether the Swedish Government would willingly consent to such a step. The contingency which M. Paul REYNAUD had in mind was that the Allies would find it impossible to remain in Narvik and would decide to destroy the mines themselves. The offer

H0691-0052



of compensation was intended to mitigate the shock which this decision would inevitably cou[illegible] in Sweden.

Filed May 22, 1946.

(Page 437
of Orig.)

Raeder No. ..100..

Defence Exhibit No. ....

Declaration by Attorney - at - Law Dr. SIEMERS:

I herewith certify that the document below:

"Documents relating to the meeting of the French War Committee of 9 April 1940"

from the

White Book No. 6 of the Foreign Office, Berlin 1941:

"Secret Documents

of the French General Staff"

has been copied correctly from page 82-84, document No. 35.

Nuernberg, 6 March 1946.

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)



H0691-0053

H0691-0054

"Documents relating to the meeting of the French War Committee of 9 April 1940"

Very Secret

(a) Minutes of Meeting

The War Committee met on 9 April at the Palais de l'Elysee, under the chairmanship of M. Albert LEBRUN, President of the Republic.

Present:

M. Paul REYNAUD, Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs

M. Edouard DALADIER, Minister for National Defence and War

M. CAMPINCHI, Minister for the Navy

M. LAURENT-EYNAC, Air Minister

M. MANDEL, Minister for the Colonies

General GAMELIN

General VUILLEMIN

General GEORGES.

The Premier communicates the latest information received on the situation. He is of the opinion that immediate action should be taken in the Narvik area, the iron ore being of capital importance for the outcome of the war. He insists that the dispatch of the Audet division to Brest should be accelerated and that their arms should immediately be shipped.

H0691-0055

He directs the Committee's attention to the fact that the race between Germany and the Allies has begun.

Admiral DARLAN proposes:

1. the advance into Belgium,
2. the laying of mines in the rivers,
3. the commencement of local attacks on the north-eastern front.

The Premier requests the opinion of General GAMELIN on these proposals.

General GAMELIN declares that he is in favour of action in Belgium.

When the Premier points out to him that the enemy has a double superiority over us in aircraft and in man-power, General GAMELIN confirms his affirmative reply, General Georges seconding him.

The Minister for National Defence and War expresses his opinion, which is entirely in favour of the operation.

The following resolution is carried unanimously:

(1) that the Government shall endeavour to obtain the consent of the Belgian Government for the proposed operation in Belgium,

H0691-0056



(2) that, subject to this consent being obtained, the operation will be carried out,

(3) that if this operation is carried out, mines will be laid in the rivers,

(4) that the Government shall inform the Norwegian Government that France will afford them aid and assistance,

(5) that the Premier, the Minister for National Defence and War, and Admiral DARLAN shall leave for London in the afternoon.

Facsimile on page 271.

H0691-0057

(b) Letter from General GAMELIN to M. DALADIER, Minister for National Defence and War, with enclosure

Very Secret

100 372 Cab. D.N.

9 April 1940

This morning's meeting, which was a meeting of the War Committee, cannot be the object of complete minutes since no representative of the Secretariat of the Supreme Council for National Defence was present.

However, in view of the gravity of the resolutions passed, it seems necessary to me to keep record of them.

I enclose herewith some draft minutes which briefly state them and which, if you approve, could be passed on the Premier.

I should, moreover, like to add, which I had no time to do this morning, that it seems to me important not to raise the question of our entry into Netherland and Luxemburg territories at the very outset.

On the one hand, especially in order to keep everything secret, there is no advantage for us in raising these two questions beforehand, and,

on the other hand, the entry into Belgium is the best preparation

H0691-0058



for our entry into the Netherlands, of which it forms the first stage, and,

Lastly, as far as Luxemburg is concerned, its territory, apart from covering the industrial centre of Longwy, is of only secondary importance for the general conduct of the war, whilst in the early stage Luxemburg covers our entry into Belgium.

It is, of course, obvious that we must be ready to deal with these two other problems subsequently without delay.

GAMELIN

H0691-0059

Draft Minutes of the meeting of the War Committee

on 9 April 1940

Very Secret

After a rapid examination of the general situation resulting from the launching of the German attack on Denmark and Norway, the following was decided:

I. The Admiral of the Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces directs operations, as far as the entire French forces are concerned, until the moment when, the land forces having been disembarked, this command will pass on land to the military authorities of the land forces in accordance with the conditions agreed upon with the British.

As far as the general conduct of the war is concerned, it is of the greatest importance to occupy the port of Narvik as soon as possible and to seize the mines at Gallivare. The Admiral of the Fleet will attempt to accelerate operations with this object in view by getting into touch with the British Admiralty.

II. With a view to resuming the initiative in the operations, France must attempt to make Belgium understand the importance for her of the advance of our troops taking place before the German attack.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the French Land Forces on the North-Eastern Front have stated that they are ready to carry out the operation. They emphasized the necessity

H0691-0060

for secrecy, in order to be able to anticipate the German reaction particularly in the sphere of air activity.

III. As far as the question of laying river mines is concerned, it has been decided that this question is now of only secondary importance and that the Chief of the General Staff for National Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces was free to commence it at an opportune moment within the scheme of general operations.

Present at the meeting:

The President of the Republic,

The Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

The Minister for National Defence and War,

The Minister for the Navy, the Air Minister and the Minister for the Colonies,

The Commander-in-Chief, Chief of the General Staff for National Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces,

The Admiral of the Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the French Naval Forces,

The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force,

The Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces on the North-Eastern Front.

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Facsimile on page 271.

(Page 445 of Orig.)

Rejected

H0691-0061

Reader No. ....101..

Defence Exhibit No. ....

**Declaration by Attorney - at - Law Dr. SIEMERS**

I herewith certify that the document below:

"Transmission of a report from the Havas Agency by the French General Staff"

from the

White Book No. 6 of the Foreign Office, Berlin 1941:

"Secret Documents of the French General Staff"

has been copied correctly from page 85-86, document No. 36.

Nuernberg, 18 March 1946.

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691-0062

Transmission of a report from the Havas Agency by the French General Staff

High Command of the Land Forces

General Headquarters

General Staff

2nd Bureau

No. 2402/2 FT

Secret

(Written note:) General GAMELIN

10 April 1940

Special Report

(Censored Havas report of 9 April)

According to information in possession of the D.N.B., the German Foreign Office is said to possess precise data concerning a large-scale sabotage attempt on the part of the British Secret Service.

This attempt was to have been carried out with the assistance of British soldiers on the Danube.

On 5 April, it became known that the tug-boats Britannia, Elisabeth, Danubia Shell, King George, Scotland and Lord Byron, accompanied by British motor-boats together with a chartered Greek vessel, the Dionysia, towing four barges, and the Albion, towing five barges, were proceeding up the Danube.

As a result of indiscretions on the part of the British members of the crew, the following details became known:—

On board the British vessels there were large

H0691-0063



quantities of revolvers, Very pistols, hand-grenades, machine-guns, ships-guns depth charges, mines, and more than a hundred specially trained British soldiers, disguised as sailors and provided with special passports, five British officers, several flying officers and also British technical personnel belonging to dynamiting and engineering squads.

The cargo had been declared as goods in transit. The leader of the expedition was one of the heads of the British Secret Service in Rumania, passing as a "vice-consul."

This expedition, organized on military lines in every detail, had been planned with the object of preventing commercial traffic with Germany from passing certain points on the Danube, thus preventing trade between the South-Eastern European States in Germany.

The Rumanian authorities, acting upon information received, stopped these suspect vessels, took them into the Rumanian harbour of Giurgevo and searched them.

On one single vessel were found more than 400 sealed cases, which had been declared as goods in transit, but which contained large quantities of high explosives.

The vessels were provided with machine-guns and quickfiring guns, thus acquiring the character of vessels intended for military operations.

It is evident from the service orders and instructions found on board

H0691-0064



that, in the event of the proposed dynamiting operations being prevented by frontier guards or by soldiers belonging to one of the South-Eastern States, the intention was to carry out landing manoeuvres and proceed with the work of sabotage from this base.

Certain parts of the banks of the Danube and of its "rapids" were to have been dynamited and the barges sunk in the fairway[1]).

(Censored Havas report, German frontier, 8 April).

(Signature illegible)

Facsimile on page 273

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[1]) The following communication regarding the same affair appeared in the issue of 6 April 1940 of the "Diplomatic Information" which the French Foreign Ministry regularly sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army:--

"Bucharest.-- The operations on the Danube planned by the British and French Admiralties have just led to an incident. The preparations made by the British, which had progressed considerably further than ours, provided for the transport of large quantities of material and a certain amount of explosives. The Rumanian authorities discovered this equipment recently on board British barges. M. Gafencu expressed his indignation to the British Charge d'Affairs, fearing that the Germans might dispatch gunboats to Rumanian waters and that Rumania might become a second Poland."

Filed May 22, 1946

(Page 449
of Orig.)

RAEDER No. 102

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration by Attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS.

I herewith certify that the document below:

Excerpt from:

Orders concerning information about friendly troops and erection of a fortified position, issued by the 2nd Belgian Grenadier Regiment, April 13, 1940:

from White Book No. 5 of the German Foreign Office, Berlin 1940;

Further documents concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending the war

The General Staff conferences by England and France with Belgium and the Netherlands,

has been copied correctly from pages 30, 31, 32, document No. 10.

Nuernberg, 21 March 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)



H0691-0065

H0691-0066



Orders concerning information about friendly troops and erection of a fortified position, issued by the 2nd Belgian Grenadier Regiment, April 13, 1940.

2nd Grenadier Regiment

Regimental Staff

Secret
No. 2463/567

In the Field, April 13, 1940.

The Commander of the 2nd Grenadiers to:

the Battalion Commanders (5copies)
the Commander of the Staff Company
the Regimental Surgeon
the Wireless Officer
the Intelligence Officer
the Commander of the Reconnaissance Section

Order for consolidating and defending the position

Hal - Castre - Pamel:

( Supplementary to my order No. 2453/565 of April 12, 1940)

I. Information concerning friendly troops -

Friendly forces will occupy a general front in the direction of Tournai - Antoing - Canal from Mons to Conde - St.Ghislain - Binche.

. . . . . .

V. Directions for carrying out work.

. . . . . .

d) Execution of work.

Work will commence on the morning of April 13. Due to their late arrival, the 2nd Grenadiers will only execute the work already

H0691-0067



planned and prepared in the course of the 12th. Until further orders work will be carried out daily including Sundays. Sectional leaders will be held responsible that all ranks are given the opportunity of attending Divine Service.

Report of work done must be submitted to me at 14 hours by April 15th (enclosed form to be used).

. . . . . .

Commander of the 2nd Grenadiers

(sgd) HERBIET

Colonel on General Staff

Facsimile on page 72

Filed May 22, 1946

(Page 452
of Orig.)

RAEDER No. 103

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration by Attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS.

I herewith certify that the document below:

Measures for railroad transportation

of French troops in Belgium.

from White Book No. 5 of the German Foreign Office,

Berlin 1940:

Further documents concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending the war

The General Staff conferences by England and France with Belgium and the Netherlands,

has bee. copied correctly from pages 22, 23, document No. 4.

Nuernberg, 26 April 1946

(Dr.W.SIEMERS)



H0691-0068

H0691-0069



Instructions for the Transportation of French

Troops to Belgium by Rail

High Command of the Army.

General Headquarters.

General Staff.

4th Bureau.

2nd Division.

No. 7.813 - 4/F.T.

General H.Q., April 18, 1940.

Instructions

for transportation by rail

according to Plan "Y"

A railway transport plan, in the event of operations on Belgian territory, has been set up at the request of the armies, for the units allotted to them which will move automatically according to the events of day J1.

This plan has been worked out on the understanding that the day J1 will be fixed by an order given the previous day before midnight, whereupon the first departures can be made as from 18.00 o'clock on day J1.

It appears that the system of entrainment prepared on the basis of the events of a certain day is too rigid. If the decision were taken during the morning of a given day, the rail transports would not start until the following day from 18.00 o'clock on, which in this case would mean a considerable delay in the rail transports.

It has, therefore, been decided that the entrainment plan shall remain unchanged,

H0691-0070



provided decision is made between 18 and 24 o'clock the day previous to day J1; that, nowever, if the decision is given before 18.00 o'clock, the whole plan of automatic transport shall be advanced by six hours, twelve hours or eighteen hours, as the case may be, it being understood that the minimum notice at present provided for the notification of the troops shall remain unchanged.

The commanders of the units whose transportation by rail is effected automatically in the event of operations in BELGIUM are, therefore, requested to maintain close contact with the offices of the Rail Transport Officer which have arranged for their transportation.

These authorities will specifically advise each unit at the proper time whether the original plan is to be advanced and by how many hours, or whether it shall operate as provided for.

For the General in Supreme Command of the Army.

For the Major-General:

(signed) HANOTEAU,

Major-General, attached.

Distribution:

.....

7th Army

.....

Facsimile on page 63 and 64

Filed May 22, 1946

(Page 455
of Orig.)

RAEDER No. 104

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration by Attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS.

I herewith certify that the document below:

Order of the English second division concerning
security measures in Belgium of 19 April 1940
from White Book No. 5 of the German Foreign Office,
Berlin 1940:
Further documents concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending the war,
The General Staff conferences by England and France with Belgium and the
Netherlands,
has been copied correctly from pages 33 and 34, document No. 11.

Nuernberg, 21 March 1945

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)



H0691-0071

H0691-0072

(Page 456, lines 1-23 incl.)

Order concerning precautionary measures in Belgium issued by the 2nd British Division, April 19, 1940.

Secret

2 Div 202/1/G/1
19 Apr 40.

4 Inf Bde (1)
5 Inf Bde (1)
6 Inf Bde (1)
4/7 D.G. (1)
R.A. (1)
R.E. (1)
R.A.S.C. (1)
Pro (1)
F.S.P. (1)
F.L.O. (1) A/Q (letter only).

1. Contact with Belgian civil authorities.

(a) The first contact in any Belgian village should be with the Burgomaster, the second with the local Brigade de Gendarmerie the headquarters of which will be found in the chef-lieu of the canton.

The Gendarmerie, as in France, are in possession of information on all inhabitants of the canton concerned.

(Page 459
of Orig.)

Filed May 22, 1946

RAEDER No. 105

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration by Attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS.

I herewith certify that the document below:

Statement of a Luxembourg subject on the presence of French troops in Belgium before May 10, 1940

from White Book No. 5 of the German Foreign Office, Berlin 1940:

Further documents concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending the war,

The General Staff conferences by England and France with Belgium and the Netherlands,

has been copied correctly from page 26, document No. 7.

Nuernberg, 21 March 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)



H0691-0073

H0691-0074



Statement of a Luxemburg Subject on the Presence
of French Troops in Belgium before May 10, 1940

Report of proceedings

taken down before Dr. RICHTER, General Consul in the presence of Captain RUPPERT and the specially appointed officer v. GAREIS, Army Command 12, Statement taken from Mr. Josef GRANDJENET.

Personal details.

My name is Josef GRANDJENET, born in Harlange, Luxemburg, on December 28, 1866 (correctly , December 27, 66), a merchant by calling. I am no longer in business and have lived for the past six months in Bertrix, 98 rue Burhaimont . I own a house in Libramont, rue Faubourg, and my permanent residence is there. For the present I am remaining here in Bertrix. I am a subject of Luxemburg, Catholic, widower. I can verify my statements by showing my identity card issued by the Commune Aubange.

Statement

I voluntarily declare on oath as follows:

About 7 days before the outbreak of the German-Belgian hostilities, that is to say, if I am not mistaken, Sunday May the 4th, or possibly the day before, about 200 French soldiers in uniform drove through Bertrix in the afternoon in armored cars coming from the south, and drove off in the direction of Libramont. I definitely recognized that they were French soldiers because I know the uniform exactly..

H0691-0075



Apart from that I recognized the soldiers by their language when they conversed with me.

Bertrix, May 15, 1940.

concluded:

(signed) GRANDJENET J.

RICHTER, General Consul

RUPPERT,

v.GAREIS

H0691-0076



Rejected

RAEDER No. 10c

Defense Exhibit No. .....

Declaration by Attorney-at-law Dr. SIEMERS.

I herewith certify that the document below:

Statements of a French prisoner of war about
the presence of French troops in Belgium
before 10 May, 1940,

from White Book No. 5 of the German Foreign Office,
Berlin 1940:
Further documents concerning the Anglo-French policy of extending
the war,
The General Staff conferences by England and France with Belgium
and the Netherlands,
has been copied correctly from page 27, document No. 8.

Nuernberg, 21 March 1946

(Dr. W. SIEMERS)

H0691-0077



Statement of a French prisoner of war on the presence of French troops in Belgium before May 10, 1940.

Report of Wireless Operator Walter DICK.

O.U. May 16, 1940.

Re: Statement of a French prisoner of war.

On May 12, 1940, I traveled with a motorcycle dispatch rider from Bertrix to Bastogne. At Recogne a destroyed railway bridge stopped us. Five French prisoners of war belonging to a tank unit were standing at the bridge. One of these prisoners addressed me in German and told me that for a whole day they had been encamped in a house to the left of the bridge and that no one had worried about them. In the course of the conversation and in reply to my opinion, how long they had been in Belgium, he answered: " Since the 15th of last month." Two infantry and anti-aircraft Lieutenants were witnesses to this conversation from time to time. I cannot say definitely that both officers took full notice of the remarks of this French prisoner of war. Besides August PICKER, the motorcycle dispatch rider, one other German soldier was present, who expressed his astonishment at the statement made.

I am prepared to confirm the above statement on oath.

(signed) Walter DICK,

Wireless Operator

August PICKER, the motorcycle dispatch rider, Unit 18330, declared:

I have heard the statement made by the French prisoner of war and am also prepared to confirm same on oath.

(signed) August PICKER,

Senior Wireless Operator.

H0691-0078

Filed May 17 Reader No. 107

(Page 464 of orig)

Affidavit

I, Richard SCHREIBER, manufacturer, located in Berlin and Munich, at the request of Dr. Walter SIEMERS, Hamburg, now in Nuernberg, am making the following sworn statement.. I expressly declare under oath that the statements correspond to the truth and that I am aware that this statement is to be submitted to the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, and that I am further aware that a false statement under oath is a punishable action.

I was born in Munich in the year 1889. My father was Privy Councellor Rudolf von SCHREIBER, who has since died. From 1909 to 1918 I was on active service as a naval officer, following this I was active in various civilian commercial positions, recently as a manufacturer in Berlin and Munich. On 7 September 1939 I was called into the German Armed Forces, the Navy, as a naval reserve officer. From autumn 1939 to the beginning of winter 1939 I was assistant officer to the naval attachd in Oslo, from the beginning of winter 1939 up to 9 April 1940, the occupation of Norway by German troops, I was detailed as naval attachd to the German Embassy in Oslo, from then on until October 1943 first adjutant and officer personnel adviser on the staff of the commanding admiral of the Navy High Command (Marineoberkommando) in Norway, which was immediately subordinate to the High Command of the Navy. (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine)

H0691-0079

I. Period before the occupation of Norway:

From autumn 1939 reports were coming in to the German Embassy in Oslo which cast doubts on the intention of the Norwegian Government to remain neutral. Thus it was said in Norwegian commercial circles that the Norwegian shipowner's association had chartered Norwegian tanker tonnage (about 1 million tons) which was important to England's war effort, to English shipping interests for long periods of time, with the confidential agreement of the Norwegian Government. Norwegian shipowners known for their friendship to England even flatly denied the existence of transactions of this kind in social conversations which gave even stronger weight to the reports. The German Navy received definite confirmation of this in the spring of 1940 ( I believe in February) through an indiscretion of a French newspaper.

In the winter of 1939/40 confirmation was given to reports on espionage missions assigned by the English and French information services to Norwegian agents and English consulates in seaports for the purpose of investigating landing possibilities and harbor capacities, the capacity of the more important Norwegian railways, the width and height of the tunnels on the Narvik railway, what could be concluded as to the shipment of heavy war material to Sweden, the location of land and sea air bases in Norway.

Intentions of the Allies to land in Norway and to

H0691-0080



block ore shipments to Germany by force of arms were claimed, the mobilization of the French Alpine Corps for embarkation and a winter war were reported and connected with an intention to land in Narvik (Northern Norway).

This information was registered at the German Embassy with all the more regret since clear directives had been received from the Foreign Office to respect Norwegian neutrality with particular care from the German side and, despite the noticeably cooler tone used in conferences by Norwegian officials, to take special care to be of the utmost correctness in all dealings with them.

The Altmark case brought me into extensive negotiations with the Norwegian Defense Ministry and the commanding admiral of the Norwegian navy, Admiral DIESSEN. Because of the high regard I had for many years for Norwegian culture, my esteem for the country and its people, I endeavored to conduct the negotiations in a conciliatory way in spite of the clear legal position and avoided any further straining of German-Norwegian relations. Any warlike conflict with Norway would have seemed to me another European calamity. We older German naval officers, who had felt a real comradeship with the British Royal Navy, for instance, in Eastern Asia in 1911/13, and had gone through the war of 1914/18 with them, deeply regretted the German-English conflict and still hoped for an end to it before the beginning of the air war.

H0691-0081

Page 467 - Line 1 to end

My considerate handling of relations with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense and the Norwegian Navy was fully approved by the German naval warfare leadership (Raeder).

The prohibition against shooting which as far as I remember already existed in the fall of 1939 for the Norwegian coastal-naval and anti-aircraft batteries, was explained by the bringing over of English airplaines to Finland. No objection was raised by the Navy, although it was a clear breach of neutrality.

Also, the firing on German merchant ships by English destroyers (beginning of 1940), when English shells fell on Norwegian territory near EGERSUND was disposed of by the German Navy with the single, friendly request for a protest to the British Government.

During my conferences in Berlin I gained the clear impression that Raeder did not wish any aggravation of the situation.

In March 1940 a remarkable number of English-speaking men appeared in Oslo, who according to information from the Norwegian Navy were supposed to be intended as nursing personnel in Finland. At the same time very serious, credible reports came in concerning measures shortly to be taken by England and France against Norway and the German shipping. Several Norwegian naval officers who were neutrally disposed expressed to me their anxiety of "being drawn into" the great international conflict.

H0691-0082

II. Period during and after the occupation of Norway:

RAEDER always stood up for a decent humane and soldierly treatment of the Norwegian people.

a. The German High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) at the suggestion of the German Navy gave the German attack troops a printed handbill, in which, among other things, the following points were contained:

The German Armed Forces are coming as friends of Norway, to protect her neutrality.

Private property of Norwegian citizens is to be carefully respected.

Also, "provisioning" is strictly forbidden and will be punished as plundering.

The honour of Norwegian women is not to be attacked.

Every German soldier must always be conscious of the fact that he is appearing as a representative of the German Reich.

b. RAEDER was against the civilian administration, as he saw in it a burden on German-Norwegian relationswhich he desired to normalize and improve by a peace treaty as soon as possible. From this resulted RAEDER's year-long struggle of TERBOVEN which prevented a peace and for the encouraging of all measures which aimed at an appeasement and decent treatment of Norway. All the increasingly severe measures

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against the Norwegian population were ordered by the German Reich Commissioner Terboven, who, by his inflammatory reports to Hitler, by the elimination of any other source of political information, by the expulsion of officials from the German Embassy, by prohibiting reports to be made by the German Navy, Army and Air Force, by his demand for the removal from command of Admiral Boehm and myself, who stood in his way in this matter, intentionally represented the situation in Norway as serious in order to prevent a preace with Norway, which would have resulted in his removal and the dissolution of the Reich Commissionership.

Raeder pointed out the error of these ways in a large number of reports and ordered, that the respect of the Norwegian population be gained by soldierly and honourable conduct on the part of the Navy; a result which was actually achieved.

C. Raeder, after the conclusion of the main operations in Norway submitted my last final report as naval attache to Hitler in May 1940 and sponsored the following military-political proposals contained in it:

Speedy, generous conclusion of peace in order to win over the Norwegian people and shorten the sufferings caused by the war.

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Prohibition of the intended transfer of captured Norwegian officers to a prisoner of war camp in Germany. Immediate release of all captured Norwegian soldiers HITLER agreed to all these points and by forwarding this report to Terboven and von FALKENHORST, directed the Reich Commission and the Commander of the armed forces in Oslo to act accordingly.

The conclusion of peace was prevented by von Terboven, in spite of the fact that it was repeatedly urged on Hitler by RAEDER in several reports submitted by the commanding Admiral in Norway.

The transfer of the Norwegian officers to Germany was in accordance with the order, not carried out.

The release of Norwegian prisoners was also carried out. Through this intervention by RAEDER thousands of Norwegian prisoners of war were spared the bitter esperiences of captivity in prisoner of war camps.

d. In all seizures of Norwegian billeting quarters the Navy took the position of the Norwegian population into consideration to the fullest extent. Lodgings seized were inventoried in the presence of the owners by naval administrative

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officials, the owner was periodically allowed access to his rooms and the control over his belongings, the "removal" of any object for private purposes was forbidden under penalty of law.

e. RAEDER tried energetically for the last time in 1942 to call HITLER's attention to his point of view on the necessity for a pacification of Norway and the immediate cessation of further errors by TERBOVEN.

He instructed me to make on exhaustive report on the situation in Norway to each of the following:

1. Minister LAMMERS

2. Adjutant General SCHMUNDT.

The report was delivered at the Reich Chancellery, that is in the personnel division of the High Command of the Armed Forces. (OKW) in the Matthaei-kirchplatz in Berlin. The reports were based on a deeply serious description of the consequences of the attitude of TERBOVEN and his civilian administration in Norway, of the dangers to the German Reich from a political and military point of view, and a warning against forcing a revolt, and culminated with the urgent request of the Navy that HITLER be told the plain truth with a full sense of responsibility and advised to make peace with Norway and recall the civilian administration.

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Admiral BOEHM made a personal 1 1/4 hours report on Norway of similar nature to HITLER in the spring of 1943.

In spite of these extensive efforts of RAEDER to change and inprose things in Norway, nothing was alone by HITLER.

Nuernberg, April 12th 1946

signed Richard SCHREIBER

(RICHARD SCHREIBER)

I, Dr. Walter SIEMERS, attorney at law, certify that the above sworn statement was personally signed today by Mr. RICHARD SCHREIBER.

signed Dr. SIEMERS

(DR.W.SIEMERS)